I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays rural landowners to accept restrictions on farming in environmentally sensitive areas. Its purpose is to "cost-effectively assist owners and operators in conserving and improving the nation's natural resource base" (FSA 2012, p. 1-2) . Landowners accepting payments while refraining from raising crops adds about $3.5 billion per year to the U.S economy through reduced erosion, increased wildlife abundance, and improved water quality (Wu and Weber 2012) . Since the program costs about $1.9 billion per year (FSA 2010) , the program represents a substantial positive contribution to the welfare of U.S. citizens.
In spite of the success of the program, CRP faces challenges such as a lower cap on the program's enrollment, attempts by some politicians to dismantle agri-environmental programs, existing restrictions on budget neutrality for some types of program development, and higher costs of land enrollment imposed by rising food prices (Hagstrom 2012; Hellerstein 2010) . While the cost-effectiveness of a policy is always important, these constraints further intensify the need for making the most of increasingly scarce resources.
A cost-effective policy would maximize the quality-adjusted amount of retired land per dollar invested. Market approaches such as auctions have failed to achieve desired results because there are not enough participants in the market: landowners with high-quality land do not need to reveal the minimum payment they are willing to accept, instead using their market power to hold out for maximum offered benefits (Claassen 2009; Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005) . Thus, it is important to identify other factors affecting the willingness of landowners to supply land for these programs (see Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008 for a discussion).
Many papers have identified factors linked to program adoption. Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) find that the two types of payments provided by the program are received differently: up-front payments seem to be preferred to the discounted sum of annual payments. They also find that cattle production is not a significant predictor of program participation.
We offer an explanation for the apparent appeal of an initial incentive over the present value of a stream of annualized payments and the initial incentive: the features of the two payments have different implications for cattle-producing and non-cattle-producing areas.
The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) counterbalances the low annual payments received in lower soil quality areas (where cattle are more likely to be raised) with rules providing government support for a larger variety of land improvements for cattle ranchers than they do for other types of agricultural producers. Because of this, cattle producers receive greater up-front incentives on average, and they are able to use government funds to improve their land in ways others are not. These developments are valued by landowners, resulting in higher levels of participation than we would expect given the annual rental payments they receive. In other words, they participate at a level comparable to areas with higher land quality.
Previous studies, having grouped all areas together rather than identifying the different way that cattle production modifies incentive effects, are missing part of the picture. As far as we know, we are the first to document such a factor that moderates incentive effectiveness.
The purpose of this paper is to identify and explore the heterogeneity in payments and in payment effectiveness in eliciting landowner participation. We verify that the initial incentive, including the cost share and the associated signing incentive payment and practice incentive payment, is significantly larger in cattle ranching counties than it is for other types of agricultural producers, while the reverse is true of the annual payment. We then investigate whether the marginal effect of the initial incentives is larger in those places, and find that indeed it is. The relationship between up-front incentives and the discounted sum of annual payments varies, resulting in different marginal effect of incentives in areas, depending on their level of cattle production.
We limit our examination to the market for one type of conservation practice. This paper focuses on CREP, and more specifically on the riparian forest buffer establishment subprogram called CP22. CREP is an incentivebased volunteer program that is managed by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 33 states. It focuses on particularly environmentally sensitive areas; as of 2008, just about 2% of total CRP land was enrolled in CREP (Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008) , but the percentage is rising, comprising 9% in 2010 (FSA 2010).
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
As a potential land renter, the government sets the price it is willing to pay. Landowners respond by choosing to continue farming or committing their land to the program for a period of time. Landowners' willingness to supply land depends on their opportunity costs of enrolling their land in the program and the incentives associated with participation. From the creation of CRP and later CREP, there have been multiple studies attempting to understand the incentives necessary to entice landowners to enroll in CRP/CREP and forgo revenue from crops or other opportunity costs. We turn to previous research to review what others have found to be important in influencing landowners' participation decisions.
The first body of research presents surveys done shortly after CRP began. Esseks and Kraft (1988) found that a small rise in incentives and a restructuring to cash rather than commodity certificates would have increased enrollment. Hatley, Ervin, and Davis (1989) identified a number of socioeconomic characteristics that influenced producer participation, including age, tenure, occupation, education, and size of holdings, concluding that the program should consider these factors in estimating demand for program take-up. Mortensen et al. (1989) sought to identify characteristics of participants and assess the impact of CRP. They considered land attributes such as soil productivity, cost of cover establishment, and the reduced costs associated with decreased use of inputs on land that would not be cultivated. They conclude that cost-sharing is key to increasing participation, but they note that land retirement may have negative effects on communities as economic output declines.
Another group of analysts investigate landowner response to incentives using contingent valuation (Cooper and Osborn 1998; Kingsbury and Boggess 1999; Lohr and Park 1995; Purvis et al. 1989; Vanslembrouck, Van Huylenbroeck, and Verbeke 2002; and Lynch, Hardie, and Parker 2002) . Contingent value analysis poses hypothetical questions to landowners and uses the answers to estimate the effects on demand of variables that differ according to each landowner, such as age. We use their accumulated insights to inform our choice of relevant variables, described below.
The third body of research is based not on interviewing landowners but on analyzing actual enrollment data. Early efforts varied in their estimates of price elasticity (Konyar and Osborn 1990; Parks and Kramer 1995; and Parks and Schorr 1997) . The most recent, by Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) , follows this approach, and so do we. Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) examine willingness to accept payment to participate in the CP22 subprogram of CREP in six states with well-developed CREP programs and where much of the land is CP22, that is, where riparian forest buffers predominate rather than a mix of riparian forest and riparian grass. Combining map layers showing land use with GIS data on rivers and streams, they calculate the amount of land eligible for program participation and use the percentage of eligible land actually enrolled in a given year as the dependent variable in a regression. They find that increasing the initial incentive, including both the cost share and the sign-on bonus, is five times more effective at increasing enrollment than increasing the annual payments (Suter, Poe, and Bills 2008) .
As far as we know, no studies have yet identified moderating factors, in other words, interactions between variables. Also, remarkably little attention has been paid to the issue of cattle production, even though incentives for ranchers differ, as we show in the next section.
III. CREP PAYMENT SYSTEM
Participants are eligible to receive several types of incentives. The first is a sign-on bonus, which is a set payment per acre. Second, an annual rental payment is assigned based on the soil rental rate and an incentive rate. Third, cost-sharing payments are given at sign-up and/or after the buffer construction to reimburse part or all of the costs associated with building the buffer as well as with any other land improvements necessary to allow the farm to continue production on land not committed to the program. Finally, some states supplement the federal incentives (MDA 2009 The second incentive is the annual payment. This payment is determined by multiplying a set number by the soil rental rate (SRR) of the parcel that is being removed from production. Ideally we would have parcel-level data on soil types; lacking that we calculate a weighted average land value by county and assume that parcels are representative of the county. We model this by estimating the county's SRR using NRCS data from the Soils Data Mart 1 and multiplying the result by the incentive rate, given in the USDA data. 2 Cost share payments are in many cases limited to reimbursement for costs associated with planting trees or grasses on the land that will be set aside. However, on pastureland, several additional practices are eligible for reimbursement, and farmers seeking financial support for improving their land in certain ways may also find CREP to be a useful source of funding. For example, if the establishment of a buffer zone around a river would limit cattle's access to a stream, a rancher may use the cost share to build fencing, a cattle crossing, and a watering trench (FSA 2012) . Joining CREP might be appealing if it covers some or all of these, though it may also require tens of thousands of dollars to be put up by the landowner (MDA 2009) . Note that the up-front payment is based on the cost of setting up the buffer and, if necessary, whatever additional development is needed to exclude cattle. Thus, agricultural producers such as cattle ranchers for whom the buffer construction represents an improvement to the land in effect receive double payment: once for the improvement itself and once again through this cash incentive.
Participation in CREP means that cattle ranchers may get government support for a variety of projects, such as building a cattlecrossing or watering trench (FSA 2012) . Between the PIP and the cost share, landowners recoup 90% of the cost of such installations, and in many states they receive more still. Producers of crops do not have comparable projects that the program might build for them, and further, since production of chickens and hogs in the United States is dominated by feeding operations rather than pasture (Key and McBride 2007) , these producers are ineligible and therefore might benefit less from CREP funding. Thus cost share funding may be more useful to cattle producers than to other types of agricultural producers, implying that counties with more pastureland may respond more to the up-front incentives.
IV. CATTLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Establishing a river buffer on cropland requires simply planting trees on that part of the land that is near a waterway, but in pastures planting near streams is likely to accomplish little on its own. For the forest buffers to be effective on cattle pasture, cattle producers must exclude their stock from the buffer. If not excluded, impacts of cattle on riparian ecosystems include landscape deformation, enhanced surface roughness as well as compacting, shearing, moving, and smearing soils. This leads to decreased infiltration capacity, which in turn results in increased and possibly changed runoff. Vegetation loss by grazing and trampling leads to soil erosion, stream sedimentation, and the loss of aquatic and bird habitat. Excreta are emitted more frequently in riparian areas when they are accessible to cattle, polluting streams and eventually groundwater as well as spreading microbial pathogens such as salmonella, giardia, E. coli, and cryptosporidium (Aarons and Gourley 2013; Sunohara et al. 2012) .
Thus, the effectiveness of the CP22 program requires excluding cattle from the managed land. This requires fencing, alternate means of watering the cattle, and perhaps crossings for the cattle to access the pasture without contaminating the water (Smolders et al. 2015) .
The effectiveness of different management practices varies by location (Sovell et al. 2000) , so it is important to allow flexibility in any policy intending to achieve conservation. Further, farmers have little incentive to undertake these costly measures, so government support is crucial (Agouridis et al. 2005) .
One last note here: Cattle producers do have somewhat different characteristics from crop producers. According to ARMS 3 (2015), in 2010 cattle farms averaged 653 acres, while crop farms were almost twice the size at 1,168 acres. Smaller size also means less net farm income: again in 2010, cattle farms averaged $11,120 to crop farms' $33,182. Along the same lines, 50% of cattle farmers listed "something else" as their primary occupation, while just 17% of crop farmers chose the same designation. Twenty-two percent of grain farmers are full owners of their farms, while 61% of cattle farmers are full owners. The groups are similarly educated, though, as 22% of grain farmers and 21% of cattle farmers had completed a bachelor's degree. Smaller farms making less money may be more likely to participate in programs like this, and ownership status may matter as well, so it is important for us to include this information in control variables.
V. DATA DESCRIPTION
To analyze the interplay of the different incentives under different conditions, we take data from 193 counties in five states for each year from 1998 to 2010. 4 We follow Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) in choosing to examine data from Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington, because of those states' mature CREP programs and high concentration of riparian forest buffers (i.e., eligibility for CP22, the subprogram we analyze) within CREP. Note that five of Suter et al.'s 218 counties are from New York, but we have dropped these observations. We lacked data for variables in some of the counties, and our several state-level variables rendered the five observations insufficient for inclusion.
We use two outcome variables. Nineteen percent of county/years (393/2,111) had enough enrollments that the total enrolled acreage was reported. If fewer than eight producers enrolled land, the total was not reported due to privacy restrictions. Because of this, we use two dependent variables: the first, used in the tobit formation, includes the share of eligible acres that enrolled. The second, a dummy variable indicating whether eight or more producers chose to participate, is used in a logit specification.
The explanatory variables of interest are the two incentives to which landowners can respond: the annual rental payment and a onetime up-front payment, which itself consists of a few parts as described above. Our data from the USDA include cost share amounts (USDA 2016), and we account for SIP and PIP to get the full initial incentive. For places with no enrollments, we imputed the incentive based on state characteristics.
Since the annual rental payments depend on soil types, we calculate weighted averages of soil rental rates. We took the NRCS's Soil Data Mart's estimates of the amounts of each of a variety of soil types in a given county and combined them with the value per acre of given soil types from the FSA and NRCS's joint Soils Data Management System. 5 Thus, we calculate a weighted average soil rental rate in a given county. Following Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) we calculate the present value of a 15-year stream of payments using a 3% discount rate. Note that we use SRR data from the entire county rather than just from participating acreage.
The cost is given in the USDA recipients' data. 6 The amount a participating landowner receives up front is the cost share (half of establishment costs) plus the PIP (i.e., another 40% of establishment costs) plus $100 per acre for the SIP. To calculate the total up-front receipts we multiply the cost share by 9/5 to add in the PIP, and finally add 100 for the SIP.
It is important to note here that the up-front payment is basically identical to the cost share in some places. In other words, it simply covers the establishment costs. If that investment, a necessary part of accepting the CREP transfers, serves no other purpose to the landowner, then it simply pays for some share of landowners' expenses: it is a small loss or perhaps something they are indifferent to. If that investment does serve a purpose to the landowners, constituting a land improvement, then it increases the appeal of participation in CREP. The CREP rules make it more likely for this to be valuable to cattle owners, as described above.
What factors might shift the supply curve? Variables were chosen based on previous studies, as described above. Factors that might increase landowners' propensity to enroll their land include higher production expenses, higher property taxes, and greater government expenditures of other types (the last two factors by increasing awareness of the government as a potential source of income). All of these variables come from the National Ag-ricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 7 "Government expenditures per acre" are total receipts from federal farm programs in the county, divided by the total acres in the county that is on farms (according to the U.S. Agricultural Census). Counties that are more rural ought to be more likely to enroll, as development pressure should not affect their land values much. We use the USDA's 2003 Urban-Rural Continuum codes to check this.
Other opportunity costs are sure to play a role. We anticipate that investments already made in the land, such as irrigation, should make landowners less likely to enroll their land in the program. Also, owner-operated facilities are likely to be more reticent, since those leasing their land to tenants might be less personally invested in the production process and more interested in a guaranteed annual return. Finally, variables including total farmland per county, farm size, and average farm income have been suggested in past work, and we include them here without a clear expectation for effects they might have. All of these variables come from the NASS.
Current and anticipated prices are also highly relevant, so we gathered information on current and past prices of soy, corn, cattle, (USDA 2016) . Soil rental rates were calculated using each county's soil types and extent as downloaded from http://websoilsurvey. nrcs.usda.gov/ on July 7, 2012; these were multiplied by the soil type incentives listed in the USDA's soil management system. and wheat. 8 Unfortunately these eight prices are highly correlated, which is not surprising given that many are substitutes in consumption as well as responsive to many of the same external conditions, from climate to national and international income shocks. To avoid multicollinearity we combined the eight prices into one using factor analysis. The first set of factor loadings puts positive weights on all prices, as we would expect, and so we use it. 9 Another variable of interest is the average age of the people in the county. 10 One school of thought holds that older people might be more willing to enroll in CRP, perhaps keeping their land undeveloped for posterity either for environmental reasons or in hopes that the next generation might be more interested in farming. Alternatively, older farmers might be thinking of selling (or leasing) the farm to finance retirement, while younger farmers might be thinking longer term (Lynch, Hardie, and Parker 2002) .
We also include state effects, as a number of other characteristics vary across the states. For example, antigovernment sentiment may be stronger in, say, eastern Washington than in Maryland. Also, characteristics of statelevel CREP programs vary, such as in Oregon where the program pays extra to a landowner whose neighbors already participate (Parkhurst 2011).
Finally, we separately control for states' supplementary payments to CREP adopters. Maryland and Washington offer 37.5% of eligible costs, while North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia offer 25% (USDA 2016).
8 Prices used are the Producer Price Index for Commodities, not seasonally adjusted, as shown by https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/.
9 Instead of the combined price produced using factor analysis, we repeated our analysis using current soy prices. We chose soy prices because they showed the highest correlation with all of the other prices. Results obtained from using the current soy prices were not materially different from the results shown.
10 "Average age of principal operator" data are from the USDA's Agricultural Census. For the 2012 census, see We considered many other variables but ultimately rejected them when they failed to show up as significant in any of our regressions. (Inclusion or exclusion does not materially affect our results.) We thought that counties with a higher percentage of educated people (data from the U.S. Census) might be more likely to enroll, again partly because of increased awareness of government programs and also potentially because of increased awareness of environmental issues. Alternatively, having higher opportunity costs to their time might mean that such farmers might choose to participate more so that they can take up other activities. Perhaps this bidirectionality of potential effects balanced out, leaving a net zero effect. Another possibility we considered was the number of acres already enrolled in the broader CRP. Again, analysis showed that this variable was not a significant predictor of program participation in any of our regressions, so it was dropped.
Finally, a key area of contrast is the presence of pastureland. NASS lists cattle sales per county, 11 and we divided this by the size of the county to get sales per acre as an indicator of the presence of cattle. We use indicators for being in the each quintile of cattle sales. Sample statistics for all variables can be found in Table 1 .
VI. SUMMARY STATISTICS
The cost share is likely to matter more for pasture owners, since more practices are authorized for cost share support when cattle are present (fencing, cattle crossings, watering trenches, etc.). around $2,569 per acre in up-front CP22 payments, while in the other areas the total is about half, at $1,328. A t-test comparing the amount of cost share awarded per acre in the high cattle areas against the amount awarded per acre in the rest of the sample showed that the difference is highly significant, with a tstatistic above 16 (p-value < 0.0001). Note, though, that the amount of cost share also has a high variance. Some producers are managing to extract more help from the government, while others get less. Among top cattle producers the annual payments are lower. The discounted sum of total payments averages about $1,407 for areas outside the top cattle-producing areas, while in those areas the payments average under $1,177. (A t-test finds that this significance too is different, with a p-value < 0.0001.) On balance, these areas enrolled at rates that differ only nominally; 22% of the top quintile of cattle-producing areas had enrollment, while 18% of other areas did. A t-test shows that the p-value for testing the difference is 0.085.
While the pattern of support is different for top cattle-farming counties, we still might expect that the marginal effect of a dollar in the up-front payment is the same across cattleproducing and non-cattle-producing areas. In other words, if the issue is simply the rate of compensation, farmers should respond the same to a higher level of payment regardless of whether they raise livestock or grain. On the other hand, if the cost share money is just reimbursement for crop producers as they establish buffers, while it provides ranchers with valuable land improvements, we would expect to see the same payment matter more for cattle producers. We turn to regression analysis to investigate whether the up-front payment has a higher marginal effect on participation in these areas.
VII. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Following Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) we estimate the effects of a variety of factors on enrollments. They note that the usual approach in past work is the log of the share of eligible acres that are enrolled in a given year divided by the share not enrolled, but the problem of zeros pushes them to a linear instead of log odds formulation:
[1]
Y 22 is the share of eligible riparian acres enrolled in CP22 each county in a given year. X cs represents the up-front payment, including the cost share incentive, PIP, and SIP. X a represents that portion of the incentive to be paid as an annual installment, while X z is a vector of other factors affecting decisions in the given year, including education, age, livestock sales per acre, and so forth, as listed in the previous section and as summarized in Table 1.
To investigate whether cattle production modifies this process, we expand equation [1] in two ways. First, we add a system of indicators for being in each quintile of cattle sales per acre. Second, we interact these indicators with the cost share, expecting that counties with more cattle sales per acre will be more responsive to the cost share, as they are allowed to direct that payment toward a greater variety of improvements to their land. As a result our estimated equation takes the form
where R G is a vector of dummy variables indicating "groups": quintiles of cattle sales per acre. The associated regression coefficients, β G , show the marginal impact on the share of eligible county land enrolled in the program associated with being in different quintiles of cattle sales per acre. The vector of interaction coefficients, β csG , shows the changing effects of the cost share incentive on enrollment across cattle sales quintiles. The data on enrollments have a few difficult characteristics. First, a county-year is not a homogeneous entity that every year decides what portion of its eligible land to enroll in the program. A county is composed of heterogeneous individuals owning various plots of land; enrollment of a large share of land in one county may represent just one landowner's willingness to participate, while a smaller share in another may represent dozens of people accepting the incentives. Thus, estimating the share of acres enrolled may not speak to the degree to which the incentives are appealing. Second, the data feature a large number of zeroes. Of 2,111 county-years, just 393 (19%) enrolled acreage into CP22. Third, data constraints make the threshold arbitrary: the number of enrolled acres is reported only if eight or more enrollments are made in a given county-year, regardless of the number of acres enrolled.
Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate to use more than one outcome variable. First, we look at the portion of eligible acres that were enrolled, using a tobit estimation as was used by Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) . Second, we use a binary variable to indicate whether eight or more landowners chose to participate in the program. (This is the threshold at which acreage is shown in our data, which is otherwise embargoed so as to preserve participant privacy.) The binary variable is the dependent variable in a logit regression. While the former uses more of the information in the data, it also attempts to estimate effects on a latent variable for which 80% of observations are not disclosed. Thus, we complement that approach with a deeper exploration of the difference between "participants" (really counties with eight or more enrollees) and "nonparticipants." This may be preferable since it does not attempt to recover information about the larger unobserved heterogeneity. Results do not vary much between the approaches.
VIII. RESULTS

Tobit Regression Results
In Table 3 , the first column shows that all coefficients have the expected signs. Higher incentives of both types-annual and upfront-significantly increase participation in the first two regressions. The first regression is most similar to that of Suter, Poe, and Bills (2008) and shows a similar result: up-front payments seem to matter more. (However, testing the coefficients reveals that the difference is not significant in either the first or second regressions.) Higher opportunity costs such as investments in irrigation, owner-operated farms, urban access, and crop prices are negatively correlated with program participation. Familiarity with government as proxied by total government expenditures per acre in the area is linked with higher enrollment, while higher tax burdens impose a slight negative effect on enrollment. Areas with more agricultural acreage are more likely to see some participation, and areas with larger farms participate more (though the effect is imprecisely estimated). State dummy variables show that participation is much lower on the West Coast (specifically Oregon and Washington) than the East (where the baseline of Maryland and Virginia is not significantly different from North Carolina).
Regression 3 (the right column) is designed to test the interaction between cattle production and the role of the up-front incentive. The negative sign on the up-front incentive and the negative signs on the higher cattle sales quintiles must be interpreted in light of the interactions below. The former reflects the issue described above: a share of the up-front "incentive" just represents a payback for the establishment costs of the conservation mea- Note: All regressions are tobit models, and coefficients are therefore marginal effects on a latent variable linked to the share of land enrolled. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
sures, which are less valuable to crop farmers. Toward the bottom of the table in the interactions, we see the anticipated greater response to up-front incentives among those with higher levels of cattle sales: while upfront incentives matter overall, the effect of incentives is much stronger in the top quintiles of cattle production. So both the size of the up-front incentive and the degree to which it constitutes an incentive are larger in cattleproducing areas. The latter, the negative coefficients on the indicators for cattle sales, show that the interaction between cattle production and the up-front incentives are the key to understanding the higher participation rates among counties producing more cattle. Table 4 lists the regression results from the logit. As in Table 3 , all coefficients have the expected signs. Higher incentives of both types-annual and up-front-significantly increase participation in the first two regressions, and interactions in the third column tell a more detailed story. Rather than looking at that column's logit regression coefficients, it may be easier to see the role of the up-front incentive synthesized graphically, as shown in Figure 1 . It combines the various coefficients into overall estimated effects on enrolment by quintile, represented by the thick bar. As we move to the top three quintiles of cattle sales Note: All regressions are logits and coefficients are logit coefficients rather than marginal effects. First quintile and first interaction are baselines.
Logit Regression Results
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. per acre, though, the marginal response to the up-front payment moves from negative to positive. This is consistent with the fact that in non-cattle-producing areas, the initial incentive does little more than compensate for start-up costs imposed on the producer. On the other hand in the more cattle-oriented areas the up-front payment is covering costs associated with improving the value of the land. Finally we use all of this information to investigate the role of the up-front incentive in different areas. Evaluating its influence requires considering the level of cattle sales, and Figure 2 is a depiction of the difference in impacts when including the full set of quintile effects found in column 3 of Table 4 . For the first two quintiles, namely, the areas with the lowest levels of cattle sales, the annual incentive has a much larger marginal effect on par- ticipation, while for the latter three quintiles, the effects of the two are equal or slightly in favor of the up-front incentive. This is consistent with the up-front payment actually representing a reimbursement for costs incurred, as described above, since the costs in question are both smaller and related to improvements that are not as desired as the land improvements valued by the ranchers. Thus, when we separate out the interacted effects of cattle sales per acre on the initial incentive, we learn more about the underlying importance of the two incentives. In cattle ranching areas, the up-front incentive is worth more both literally (i.e., it is usually larger in amount) and figuratively (i.e., it constitutes a greater enticement to participation per dollar).
IX. DISCUSSION
The CRP and CREP have been highly effective investments, returning environmental benefits worth almost double what the programs cost (Wu and Weber 2012) . This research has identified a few quirks in the incentive structure, and perhaps optimizing this system of payments could result in an even higher return.
As it stands, the current incentive system offers something different to those who would enroll pasture. The handbook describing how incentives are to be awarded details specific areas in which cattle farmers can be reimbursed for a larger set of expenses. Thus, producers wishing to develop their land in a certain way can find support from this program in order to do so, a benefit that other potential participants cannot receive. This enticement is further magnified by the fact that federal cost sharing provides the basis for more than just reimbursement: it determines the amount producers receive from PIPs as well as the state systems. Since each provides a multiple of these eligible costs back to producers as an additional incentive, the implementation expense becomes a multiplier for other, up-front cash incentives. Since crop producers are ineligible for this cost sharing they stand to benefit much less. The data do in fact reflect this discrepancy, as in non-cattle-producing areas the amount of the cost share does not affect the proportion of eligible acres enrolled in CREP's CP22 program.
Overall, counties in the top quartile of cattle sales participate in CP22 at the same rate as others: the rate of participation is not significantly different. However, this is in spite of a shifted set of incentives. We showed above that counties in the top quartile of cattle sales per acre receive significantly more upfront incentives than producers in other areas. At the same time, annual incentive payments in these counties are lower than in others (t > 10, p(t) < 0.0001), implying that lowerquality land is being preserved in these cases.
This study has taken a positive approach to analyzing CREP, showing that the offered incentives do differ and responses to each are as we would expect. We are unable to answer the normative question of whether the current set of incentives is optimal. Currently, lowerquality land that has cattle on it is protected to a greater extent than similar-quality land without cattle, and it may be protected to a greater extent than some higher-quality land. At the same time, the lower-quality protected land is perhaps avoiding a worse fate, as cattle can inflict a great deal of damage to sensitive land, potentially a more worthy goal than avoiding cropping in the same places. Hubbard, Newton, and Hill (2004, E255) note that "watersheds with concentrated livestock populations have been shown to discharge as much as 5 to 10 times more nutrients than watersheds in cropland or forestry." Thus, the establishment of forest buffers and the associated fencing and water troughs to protect streams from cattle and other animal populations perhaps ought to be incentivized. Further, cattle may benefit from the shade provided by a buffer and possibly benefit from protective fencing built as part of the buffer. Should federal policy take into account these benefits? Or instead should the priority be on protecting high-quality land and, in particular, streams from crop fertilizers and pesticides? Cropland may suffer more negative externalities from a buffer, including increased access by (crop-stealing) wildlife and/or higher irrigation costs, so maybe more resources should go into encouraging crop producers to develop buffers. A complete comparison of costs and benefits of the current policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
Further research might consider other factors that amplify or dampen the appeal of incentives, and the normative implications of our work should also be given more attention. Cattle farmers' characteristics may imply a different level of receptiveness to incentives. They are more likely to own their farms, implying less interest in participation, but those farms are usually smaller, perhaps implying more interest. Given this diverse set of factors affecting supply and demand for participation, are the current incentives appropriately balanced? If data on emissions could be compiled, a direct comparison of incentives with averted pollution would likely yield means for further optimization. As has been noted previously (cf. Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008; Talberth et al. 2015) , a pay-for-performance scheme is likely optimal; however, getting adequate data makes that difficult. Targeting cattle-producing areas, as the current policy does, may be a good first step toward that, but the allocation might be improved.
That said, the conclusions we draw are necessarily limited to those few areas for which we had data, and findings may not be easily extrapolated to other states. (State dummy variables in our regressions showed that enrollment significantly varies by state even when taking into account the variety of factors we included.) The study areas were chosen as areas with mature programs already committed to this type of conservation practice, so newer participants in particular may not respond similarly.
This paper has shown that consideration of interacting producer and incentive characteristics is important, and policy design should do so to improve program targeting and costeffectiveness. Surely those of all political persuasions can agree that maximizing the return on federal dollars is a worthy goal for future research.
